PARIS ACTS TO BAR CEASE-FIRE NOW
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Fears That Immediate Halt in Military Operations Would Save Nasser

By HAROLD CALLENDER
Special to The New York Times.

PARIS, Nov. 2—The French Government moved fast today to prevent a United Nations cease-fire in the Suez Canal Zone.

It feared a halt in military operation now would save Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt, whose regime the French and British seek to liquidate. In that case the French would feel deprived of a victory they regard as already within their grasp.

This was the explanation of the hurried trip to London during the day by Christian Pineau, French Foreign Minister, that was given by high political authorities here tonight.

In London, M. Pineau, Prime Minister Eden and Selwyn Lloyd, British Foreign Secretary, were reported to have agreed they would not accept a cease-fire at least until British-French troops had landed. They were expected to land tomorrow.

Action by U. N. Noted

The United Nations General Assembly voted early today for a cease-fire in the Middle East but the question was how it could be carried out.

[Prime Minister Eden rejected a Laborite demand that he order an immediate end to British attacks on Egypt. This was in response to Laborite pressure that he comply with the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly calling for a cease-fire.]

The fear that took posession of French officials was that Prime Minister Eden might agree to a premature cease-fire.

If so, he would do it, according to these officials, because he is harried by the British Labor party to call off the French-British military expedition to Egypt, and because he is pressed by Secretary of State Dulles, who is credited here with desiring a cease-fire before the United States election Tuesday.

It was even suggested that the United States Sixth Fleet, now in the Mediterranean, might be mandated by the General Assembly to occupy the Suez Canal zone, instead of the French-British forces now preparing to occupy it.

This fear arose because Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, proposed yesterday in New York that the General Assembly should authorize the immediate

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creation of a United Nations police force to guard the frontiers between Egypt and Israel pending a political settlement. Mr. Dulles welcomed this suggestion.

Since there is no other sizable armed force available for such an "immediate" role, French officials apprehended that the United States fleet, possibly diluted with token forces of other countries, might be chosen as the police force that Mr. Pearson showed was wanting.

Thus the French fear was that a political defeat, manipulated by Mr. Dulles and facilitated by Sir Anthony, for domestic political reasons, might save the Egyptian President.

Egypt's Setbacks Noted

This fear was particularly painful since authorities here said they were convinced that Egyptian armed power had virtually collapsed. Military officials said the Egyptian Air Force had been virtually destroyed by British and French bombing, and that consequently the aircraft expensively bought from the Soviet Union recently existed no longer as a menace to the West.

They said Israeli troops had captured or driven away such Egyptian forces as were east of the canal, and that those West of the canal were demoralized.

Therefore, the French contended, President Nasser could do nothing in the way of resistance unless the United Nations stepped in to save him at the instigation of the United States, which is accused of having supported President Nasser in the past and of being in no hurry to get rid of him now.

When asked how long it would take the British and French forces to occupy the canal zone if left free to do so, military authorities said it was a matter of only a few days.

When asked why they had not landed sooner since the Egyptian Air Force was liquidated, they said it was because the pre-arranged plan did not call for such quick landing and the forces involved were massive and not easy to move ahead of schedule.

It has been said here that the plan was to seize the canal zone within eight to fifteen days so as to cause the minimum of casualties on both sides.

The French doubts about Sir Anthony reflect an old French suspicion that Britain and the United States will get together behind the backs of France when least expected to do so. Some Frenchmen could hardly believe this week that London actually was joining Paris against the will of Washington in moving into the canal zone.

The French doubts about Mr. Dulles result from mistrust that reached a climax in the Suez negotiations last August. They believed Mr. Dulles was with them at the beginning of the first Suez conference in London, but did not stay with them afterward. There has been bitter feeling in consequence in French official circles.

This has spilled over into the more nationalistic newspapers that faithfully reflect official emotions. An example was Le Figaro, which said yesterday that Mr. Dulles had conducted foreign policy with an eye solely to the fortunes of the Republican party.

It was for these reasons that it was possible for high French officials to suggest that Mr. Dulles might once again disappoint them by going to the rescue of President Nasser at the last moment.

For the French it was a bitter reflection that this would be done in the name of international law and morality. For they regard President Nasser as the negation of both. Getting rid of him was the immediate war aim of France and Britain, although they do not call their blow at Egypt a war.

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