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New York Times (1857-Current file); Jun 8, 1967; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2002)
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WASHINGTON, June 7—Israel has resorted to violence and won its victory. Among her friends and particularly those whose ties to her are of blood and the spirit, there can only be relief and exultation. Yet, victory is not necessarily settlement; and perhaps only as the battle ends will the enormity of what has happened come clear.

It ought to be realized first that the United Nations failed, the big powers failed, American guarantees failed, everything failed to prevent war; so war came, men died, and once again what Woodrow Wilson called "Force, force without stint or limit" prevailed. And who knows what threatened or frustrated leader next will draw the lesson that his needs can most quickly be won at the point of a gun?

Gasoline on the Fires

Nor will military triumph over the Arab states bring an end to their profound hostility toward Israel, or to the deep-seated Arab bitterness that festers on the conviction that the Western nations imposed the Jewish state on them unfairly and with callous disregard for their rights and feelings. Indeed, if anything could further have enflamed Arab hatred on the question of Israel, the humiliating new defeat will have done it.

So smashing does the Israeli triumph appear to be that the fate of the Arab leaders, particularly Nasser of Egypt and Hussein of Jordan, is in doubt; after Nasser's posturing on the banks of Aqaba, it is difficult to see how he can survive such a collapse even in Egypt, much less as the herald of pan-Arabism. Perhaps few will mourn Nasser, but Hussein had been considered here a force for stability in the Middle East, and it is by no means clear what new regimes ultimately may arise.

What Kind of Leader?

King Farouk gave way to the Egyptian Army and Nasser after the Arab defeat of 1948; that was no gain for Israel and some new Egyptian leader might prove even more inflammatory and determined to restore his nation's tarnished pride.

Whatever new order emerges in the Arab world also may be even more pro-Soviet than was Nasser. The latter's charges that the United States and Britain aided Israel will be believed widely by Arabs seeking a rationale for defeat, most of whom already condemn Washington as Israel's sponsor. And if the Soviets have not covered themselves with glory in the crisis, they have at least talked strongly on behalf of the Arabs.

These effects will be heightened by Israel's understandable intention to claim the spoils of military victory—passage through Suez and Aqaba, stronger border guarantees, territorial gains on the Jordanian border. A long Israeli presence in Sinai also has to be expected, particularly if the more hawkish elements in Tel Aviv now come to power.

Because of Israel's demonstrated military power in the Middle East and her demonstrated political support in the United States, it will be difficult for the Johnson Administration to restrain these demands. Because the Administration failed to make good the guarantees given Israel concerning the Gulf of Aqaba after the 1956 war, it will be equally difficult for Washington to persuade Tel Aviv again to accept pledges of support as a substitute for positions of guaranteed power.

Yet there remain forty million Arabs, sprawling across Africa into Asia, astride ancient east-west routes, identifying themselves not only with Moslems everywhere but with all the peoples once exploited by Western colonialism (a theme upon which the Soviets have consistently played), controlling a vast share of the world's oil and therefore wielding considerable influence over Western economies—for instance, over the pound sterling. Even in defeat, they are neither negligible nor helpless.

America's Position

With its influence among these people now virtually nil, with its ability to moderate Israeli demands on them at a low ebb, needing Soviet cooperation to make any peace arrangements credible and effective, the United States is in poor condition indeed to erect a new and stable political arrangement between Middle East antagonists, one of which is flushed with victory and the other of which is *smoldering in new humiliation* and new resentment.

Israel, it can hardly be doubted, acted only when it believed its threatening neighbors and its reluctant friends had left it no choice. Yet violence, as always, has raised new problems for every old question it may have decided. Men are dead in the lonely desert, but they have not brought peace to the Middle East.

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